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ABSTRACT 
This paper is devoted to a general discussion of the combination of distinct 
imprecise or uncertain pieces of information pertaining to the same logical or 
numerical variable in rule-based expert systems using numerical approximate 
reasoning techniques. The reasons that the result of  this combination may be 
meaningless are considered in detail. In particular, the presence of implicit default 
assumptions in the condition part of a rule is discussed and coped with. Moreover, 
the paper studies why the conclusions obtained by the most specific rule must be 
definitely preferred to conclusions derived using more general rules. Specificity 
ordering is defined within the framework of possibility theory. 
KEYWORDS: rule.based inference system, combination operation, data 
fusion, imprecision, uncertainty, rule specificity, possibility theory 
INTRODUCTION 
In rule-based expert systems, several conclusions concerning the same logical 
or numerical variable may be obtained using different rules and/or facts. When 
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these conclusions are pervaded with imprecision or uncertainty, a combination 
operation is usually performed in order to fuse the different pieces of 
information about hat variable. Several approaches have been proposed to this 
problem in the various existing frameworks for the quantitative modeling of 
uncertainty; see Buchanan and Shortliffe [1], Shafer [2], Smets [3], Hamburger 
[4], Martin-Clouaire and Prade [5], Dubois and Prade [6], and Kosko [7] for 
examples. In many expert systems this combination is performed in a blind 
manner, i.e., each time distinct pieces of information are obtained about the 
same variable. However, before determining the nature of the combination, 
there is the preliminary problem of deciding if a combination should be 
performed. Indeed there exist situations where one piece of information must be 
preferred to the others (which then can be forgotten) or where the meaningful- 
ness of the degree of uncertainty computed in the combination operation could 
be debatable. 
In this paper we discuss whether it is or is not suitable in certain situations to 
perform a combination. This discussion takes place in the framework of 
possibility theory, since this model enables us to deal with imprecision and 
uncertainty in a unified way, and since the use of max and min operations does 
not require too precise an assignment of the degrees of uncertainty. In the 
following the ill-known value of a logical or numerical variable will be 
represented by means of a possibility distribution that restricts the more or less 
possible values of the variable. Saying that a value is (somewhat) possible refers 
to the lack of sufficient information to be able to definitely discard this value for 
the variable, rather than to a degree of admissibility or adequacy as in 
multicriteria ggregation problems. Besides, we consider only single-valued 
variables; i.e., the values restricted by a possibility distribution are mutually 
exclusive as possible candidates for the value of the variable. In the case of a 
multiple-valued variable, a conjunctive set of values is attached to the variable 
(e.g., time intervals are conjunctive pieces of knowledge) and the combination 
works differently, as pointed out by Yager [8]. That is, the logical conjunction 
of conjunctive pieces of knowledge translates into a union operation on the sets 
of values rather than into an intersection-like operation as it usually does in the 
single-valued case. Before dealing with the questions pertaining to combination, 
we present a discussion on representation issues. 
REPRESENTATION ISSUES 
Levels of Representation and Notations 
By facts we mean statements expressing restrictions on the possible values of 
variables. Typically a fact is of the form "the value of X is in A"  or, more 
briefly, "X  is A , "  where X is a variable whose domain is U and A is a subset of 
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U. The variable X refers to the attribute of some object x. The triple ( / attribute), 
(object), (subset of values)) is the basic structure used for the representation f 
pieces of information i  the following.l. The capital etters X, Y, Z will denote 
attribute variables; the lowercase letters x, y, z, objects; and the capital etters 
A, B, C, subsets of (attribute) values. When necessary, a notation such as X(x) 
will be used to specify the object o which the attribute applies. We assume that 
the attribute variables under consideration i the following are single-valued; 
i.e., the statement "X(x)  is A"  means that he value of X(x) is some element of 
A and can be written in mathematical style "X(x)  E A . "  This contrasts with 
the statements expressing "conjunctive" knowledge mentioned in the introduc- 
tion, where the value of the attribute is then a collection of elements. The 
statement "X(x)  E A"  is equivalent to the statement "x  E (g," where (~ is a 
subset of objects having the following property: their attribute X takes its value 
in A. Script capital etters (~, ~,  C will denote subsets of objects. A subset 
can be viewed as the extension of a predicate that is true for the object x if and 
only if x E (g. 
By rules we mean general statements applying to a class of objects. Some 
rules are unconditional, i.e., they are of the kind "Vx, X(x) E A."  They apply 
to any object hat may be encountered in the field of application of the rule. Most 
of the rules are conditional and are of the form vx, if X(x) E A then Y(x) E 
8"  or, equivalent, Yx, i fx  E (g then Y(x) E B," "vx,  i fx  E (g thenx E (B," 
etc. More generally the condition part or the conclusion part of a rule may 
involve conjunction or disjunction of elementary propositions (i.e., propositions 
that pertain to one attribute variable). Note that an expression in terms of 
attributes of a proposition like "x  E ~"  may require more than one attribute 
variable. It is worth noting that a rule like "Vx, i fX(x) E A and Y(x) E B then 
Z(x) E C" can be viewed as a partial and inaccurate specification of a mapping 
f ,  i.e., Z(x) = f(X(x), Y(x)) E C, as soon as X(x) E A and Y(x) E B. 
Possibility Distributions 
Expert knowledge is usually pervaded by vagueness and uncertainty. 
Vagueness is due to the reference to subsets with unsharp boundaries in the 
knowledge xpression. Uncertainty is often due to the existence of exceptions 
for many rules in practice. Let us first consider the treatment of vagueness. A 
statement like "X(x) E A,"  where A is an ordinary subset, becomes more 
imprecise as A becomes larger; however, since the boundaries are crisp, the 
statement expresses that any value in A is possible for X(x), while any value in 
,,1 (the complement of A) is excluded for X(x). This remark gives birth to the 
i More generally, we may have to deal with a tuple of objects rather than just one object; for 
instance, the attribute "distance" applies to a pair of entities. For simplicity, here we only consider 
attributes pertaining to single objects. 
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representation f the statement in terms of a possibility distribution ~rx(x) (Zadeh 
[9]). Namely, ~rxcx) is a mapping from U to [0, 1] defined by 
I1  i fu  E A 
vu E U, wx(x)(u)= 0 i fu  (~ A (1) 
which gives the binary degree of possibility that X(x) is equal to a particular 
value in U. Note that the degrees 0 and 1 do not play symmetrical roles in (1). 
Indeed, lrxtx)(u) = 0 means that u is (certainly) not the value of X(x), while 
~xtx)(u) = I does not mean that u is the value of X(x), but only that u is 
possible (or not impossible) as a value for X(x). Since X(x) takes only one value 
in U, the elements of A are mutually exclusive as possible values for X(x). If we 
want to model the idea that among the possible values that may be taken by X(x) 
some appear to be more possible than others, it seems natural to allow ~rx(x) to 
take values intermediary between 0 and 1. Then the boundary of ,4 becomes 
unsharp, since by definition the membership function of the fuzzy set A is equal 
to ~'x(~), i.e., 
vu E U, ~A(U)=~X(x)(U) (2) 
Even when A is a fuzzy set, we will use the notation X(x) E A to express that 
the value of X(x) is restricted by #A in the sense of (2). We may also write "x  E 
( i"  with the understanding that #~(x) = #A(X(x)). Even when A is fuzzy, the 
core of A, defined by c(A) = {u E U, #A(U) = 1} is assumed to be 
nonempty; in that case A is said to be normalized. 
Let s(A) be the support of A defined by s(A) = {u E U, 7rx(x)(u) > 0}. 
Only the values outside s(A) are definitively eliminated as possible values for 
X(x). The ordering induced by the positive possibility degrees among the 
elements of s(A) reflects a state of partial knowledge where some values are 
considered more unlikely, less feasible, or more unexpected than others for the 
variable. This state of belief may be revised when new information becomes 
available; however, possibility degrees equal to 0 are not liable to be modified in 
this process, since ~rX(x)(U) = 0 means that it is established that X(x) *= u. 
The set inclusion is extended to fuzzy sets in the following way: 
AI c A2 if and only i fVu E U, I£AI(U)<<-#A2(U) (3) 
This is in agreement with the fact that a possibility distribution becomes all the 
more restrictive for the attached variable as the corresponding fuzzy set [in the 
sense of (2)] becomes mall. The information "X(x)  E A 1" will be said to be 
more specific than the information "X(x)  E A2" as soon as we have AI ----- A2. 
Even i fA is fuzzy, knowing that X(x) E A, we are certain that the value of 
X(x) is in s(A ). When we are not completely certain that the value of X(x) is 
restricted by some proper subset of U, but only "almost" certain that X(x) E 
A, the uncertain information can be represented by the possibility distribution 
vu E U, WX<x)(U)=max [#A(U), ~,] (4) 
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where 3` E [0, 1] estimates the possibility that X(x)  takes its value outside A 
(supposed to be a proper subset of U). The quantity 1 - 3` corresponds to the 
amount of certainty attached to the statement "X(x )  E A."  When 3` = 0, (4) 
reduces to (2). Note that max (#A, 3`) ~ #A * defines a fuzzy set A * such that 
s(A *) = U. The expression (4) for modeling the piece of information "the 
certainty that X(x)  E A is equal to 1 - 3`" when A is an ordinary subset can be 
justified in the following way. First the uncertain assertion "it  is (1 - 3`) certain 
that X(x)  E A'" is interpreted as " it  is 3` possible that x E A , "  where ~] 
denotes the complement o fA .  It translates into the following constraint, dictated 
by the laws of possibility theory (Zadeh [9]): 
max t~B(u) = 3` 
uEA 
where B stands for any fuzzy set such that "X(x )  E B"  is semantically 
equivalent to "X(x )  E A with certainty 1 - 3`". The principle of minimum 
specificity (Dubois and Prade [10]) stipulates that the least specific fuzzy set B 
[in the sense of (3)] that satisfies the constraint must be selected. It is easy to 
check that this fuzzy set is unique and is A *, as given by (4), i.e., ~rx¢x) = #A * 
= max (#~, 3`) when A is an ordinary set. When A is a fuzzy set, it is natural to 
keep (4) as a representation f the information "X  E A is (1 - 3`) certain"; 3` is 
understood as the possibility that X(x)  does not belong to the 3`-cut Ax = 
{ u l#A (u) _> 3` }. A * can be viewed as a fuzzy or imprecise default value for 
X(x) ;  see Prade [11, 12] for a preliminary study on the management of such 
default values in reasoning processes. As we will see in the next section, a 
possibility distribution like (4) is obtained as a representation of the conclusion 
of a rule having exceptions; 3, is then an (upper) estimate of the possibility that 
some exception occurs from some x, i.e., X(x)  may take its value outside Ax in 
unusual situations; no information being available about he most possible values 
in such situations, a uniform level of possibility equal to 3` is used (a more 
specific restriction would be arbitrary). In practice, an expert would provide A * 
directly in the form of two subsets and a degree of certainty, interpreted, 
respectively, as c(A), Ax and 1 - 3` (in ordered scales). 
Conditional Possibility Distributions and Rules 
We already pointed out that a rule expresses a relationship between attribute 
variables. In the following we assume that the attribute variables involved in a 
rule pertain to the same object x 2. A rule expressing a restriction of the value of a 
variable Y(x) provided that some conditions are satisfied by the values of a set of 
2 Note that a rule like "vx, ifX(x) E A then Y(y) E B," where the object y is related to the object 
x by a function ~o, i.e., y = ~o(x), can be always rewritten as "Vx, ifX(x) E A then Y*(x) E B" 
with Y* = yo~o. 
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variables Xt(x), ---, Xn(x) can be represented by a conditional possibility 
distribution Trlxl,'",xn, which is a mapping from Vx Ut x ". .  x Un to [0, 1], 
where V and U/are the domains of Y and Xi, respectively. (For the sake of 
simplicity, x is omitted in the notations.) The quantity ~rrtxl, ...,x~(V, ut, "" ", 
un) estimates the possibility that Y = v when Xt = ut and ... and X~ = un. In 
the following, for simplicity, we assume that V(ut, " ' ,  un), 3v, grlxt....,x~(V, 
ut, " " ,  Un) = 1, that is, ~rlxt,'",xn(', ut, " " ,  un) is always normalized; in 
other words, whatever the value of Xt(x), " ", Xn(x), there exists a 
corresponding value for Y(x). For instance, the rule "Vx, if X(x) E A then 
Y(x) E B,"  where A is an ordinary set and B may be a fuzzy set, can be 
represented by means of the conditional possibility distribution 
VU E U, Vv E V, ~rYix(V, u)= [ pa(V)l ififuU E(~ AA (5) 
which clearly expresses that when X(x) E A, the more or less possible values 
of Y(x) are restricted by B or, if we prefer, that "Vx, ifX(x) E A then lrrtx) = 
tin" and every value v is possible when X(x) ~. A. For the representation f 
rules involving fuzzy sets in the expression of their condition parts, see Dubois 
and Prade [13, 14] and Martin-Clouaire and Prade [15]. 
RULE APPROXIMATION BY ELIMINATION OF VARIABLES When the set 
restricting a variable Y is conditioned by the values of several variables Xi, we 
may think of approaching the underlying conditional possibility distribution by 
another conditional possibility distribution i volving fewer variables, which will 
then correspond to a simpler ule having fewer conditions to satisfy. This may be 
done when some a priori knowledge is available about the possible values of 
some Xi perhaps conditioned by other Xfs. For instance, in the case of two 
variables XI and X2, we have, by the laws of possibility theory, VUl E Ul, vv 
EV.  
approx a priori . ul)] (6) 
~" YlXl(I), U l )= sup min [~rlxlx2(v ' ul, u2), ~'X2IXli, U2, 
u2~ u2 
In (6) the rain is used to conjunctively combine independent pieces of 
information as usual in fuzzy set theory. Then a projection is performed. Our a 
priori knowledge concerning the value of X2 may be pervaded with uncertainty 
and can be regarded as a fuzzy default value in the sense of (4) in the most 
general case. Suppose we take for granted that "¥x C ~t, X2(x) E A* with 
#A~ = max ~A2, ~'), i.e., usually ifXt(x) E Al then X2(x) E A2, but there is a 
possibility estimated by )~ of encountering an object x such that X2(x) E /]2 
(where the complementation s defined by/.t/i 2 = 1 - -  /.tA2 ) .  Then the nile "vx, 
ifXt(x) E Al and X2(x) E A2 then Y(x) C. B" can be approximated by the 
rule "Vx, if X,(x) C Al then Y(x) C B*"  when At and A 2 are ordinary sets; 
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B* can be calculated by applying (6) and (5) with X = (Xl, X2), u = (ul, u2), 
a pnorl ~ A = Al X A2, and ~rx21xl (u~, uO = #A~'(U2), VUl E AI and 1 otherwise. 
VUl E U~, vv E V, 
~0pro~ I #B*(v)= max [#B(v), X] if ul E Al 
Irvlx1(V, ul)= l i ful  (E AI (7) 
Possibility distribution (7) expresses the possibility k that Y(x) ~. Bx when 
Xl(X) E Al; this possibility corresponds exactly to the estimate of the 
possibility that X2(x) E -42- 
Note When A2 is a fuzzy set, (7) is still obtained provided that we use the 
implication 
1 if #A(U)<--#B(V) 
lryIX(V' U)=#A(U)~#B(V)= #B(V) if #A(U)>#8(V) 
for representing the rule "Vx, i fX(x) E A then Y(x) E B" (Dubois and Prade 
[13, 14]); the conjunction "Xl(X) E A! and X2(x) E A2" is then represented 
by means of min, i.e., 
"l~y[xi,x2(V , Ul ,  u2)=min [#A l ( l /1 ) ,  #A2(U2)]-'~gB(V). [] 
Let us consider the particular case of domains having only two values, i.e., U~ 
= { ul, ul }, U2 = { u2, u2 }, V = { v, 0 }. Each pair of values corresponds to 
two opposite (nonfuzzy) propositions defined according to the equivalences 
"Xl(x) = ul" ¢* "pl(x) is true," "X2(x)= u2" • "pE(x)is true," " r (x )  = 
v" ¢* "q(x) is true," "Xl(x) = al"  ¢* "pl(x) is false," etc. This may be 
obtained, for instance, by using the coarsened omains {Al, ,41 }, {A2, A2}, 
{B, /}} provided that AI, A2, B are ordinary sets (in order to preserve the 
excluded-middle law); then, for example, "pl(x) is true" would mean "Xl(x) 
E A l . "  With the new notation, 7rrlx(V, ul, u2) = ~r(qlpl, P2), ~rYIx(O, Ul, u2) 
= (-" q[Pl, P2), etc. [for example, ~r(-, qlPl, P2) stands for the possibility that 
q(x) is false when pl(x) and p2(x) are true], expression (6) can be written in 
matrix form as 
~r(-'qlp,)/= LTri-,qlp,, p2) ~(-~qlp,, -,p=) ~r(-,P=IP,)J 
where the matrix product is performed using max instead of the sum and min 
instead of the product. This kind of notation is used extensively by Farreny and 
coworkcrs [16, 17]; 7r(q I -'Pl) and ~r(-~ q[-~Pl) are similarly defined. The 
square matrix corresponds to the rule "¥x, ifpl(x) and p2(x) arc true then q(x) 
is true"; and example of such a rule is " i f  a person is rich and conformist, then 
he/she spends his/her vacations in a fashionable place." We have lr(q[pl, p=) = 
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1, 7r(-~ qiPt,/72) = 0, and ,r(.[ .,.) is equal to 1 for all the other instances. The a 
priori knowledge that p2(x) is more often true than -~p2(x) given that pt(x) is 
true is modeled by 7r(P2iPJ) = 1, ~r(-~P2[P0 = h. Then (8) yields ~r(qlp3 = 1 
and x(-~ qlPt) = k, which corresponds tothe approximate rule "Vx, ifpi(x) is 
true then q(x) is true with cet~minty ~"; i.e., in the above example, " i f  a person 
is rich, then it is likely that he/she spends his/her vacations in a fashionable 
place" (assuming that rich people are usually conformist). Note that we have 
*r(qlPt, -~P2) = 1 = ~(-~ qlPt, ~P2) due to the absence of any information 
about q(x) in the situation "pt(x) true, p2(X) false." Given the extra 
information that in this situation q(x) is always true, a'(-~ qiPl) would be equal 
to O instead of k and the approximate rule would have no exception; obviously in 
this case a condition about p2(x) in the rule is superfluous. Indeed, saying that 
something is (somewhat) possible means exactly that there is not sufficient 
information to prove that it is false. The degrees of possibility attached to the 
different possible alternatives reflect our present state of belief based on the 
available information. 
APPROXIMATION BY FUSION OF RULES Now we examine another example of 
rule approximation using a priori knowledge. Let us suppose we have the two 
rules "Vx, i fX(x) E At then Y(x) E Bt" and "¥x, i fX(x) E A2 then Y(x) 
E B2," whereat andA2 are ordinary subsets of Usuch that At (1 A2 = 0; BI 
and B2 may be fuzzy. Let A = a I U A2. According to (5), the first rule is 
represented by 
I'#Bt(v) i fu  E Al 
• " ~,lX(U, 
u )= Ii i fu  ~ At '  
the second rule by 
~" #82(v) if u E A2 ~'2]X(P, U) 
l 1 if u ~ A2 " 
The two rules can be conjointly represented by 
f/~Bt(V) U At if E 
"XYix(v, u)= ~/~B2(v) if u E A2. 
t. 1 i fu  (EA 
(The combination of the two rules is an obvious operation here, since when the 
condition part of one rule is satisfied, the condition part of the other is not.) Let 
us assume that we have the a priori knowledge that i fX(x) E A, then X(x) E 
A t with a possibility equal to kt and X(x) E A2 with a possibility equal to ~2. At 
least one of the two numbers kt and X2 must be equal to 1, i.e., max ()~b ~2) = 
1; indeed, when X(x) E A, X(x) takes its value in either Ai or A2. This is 
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represented by 
apnon I0  ~1 i fu  E At 
~rx (U)= if U (E A. 
kk2 i fu  E A2 
The following sup-min composition then gives the possibility distribution 
restricting the possible values of Y(x) knowing that X(x) E A : 
Yv E V, ,ry(x)(U)=suep a min [~rvlx(V, u), ~r~vPn°n(u) ] 
=max {min [#al(U), )~1], min [#s2(v), )~2]} (9) 
Finally, using (5), we obtain the following representation: 
approx ,, 
Yu E U, Vu E V, ,r YIx ~u, u) 
f f tB , (P )=max {mill [#Bl(O), )~1], min [#B2(U), k2]} 
l 1 
i fu  E A 
i fu  (~ A 
(10) 
for the approximate rule "¥x, i fX(x) E A then Y(x) E B*,"  where the fuzzy 
set B* is defined in (10). B* is obtained as a weighted union (see Dubois and 
Prade [181) of the conclusions of the two rules we start with; the weighting 
corresponds tothe respective amounts of possibility of being in A ~ or in A2 when 
X(x) E A. This is in agreement with our intuition. In the particular case where 
B2 = V, the second rule becomes a triviality and (10) yields 
ap~ .... ~B. (v )=max [#BI(v), k2] i fu  E A 
lrylx~V,U)= i fu  ~ A"  
Thus we see that enlarging the set used in the expression of the condition part of 
the first rule from AI to A leads to the uncertain rule "¥x, if X(x) E A, then 
Y(x) E B~" with an uncertainty k2; i.e., there is a possibility equal to k2 that 
Y(x) is outside B1 when X(x) E A. 
In the case )k I = k2 = 1, (10) only expresses the rule "Vx, i fX(x) E Al U 
A2 then Y(x) E B1 O B2," which is weaker than either of the original rules. 
Although weaker, this type of approximation is very useful in expert systems for 
the processing of disjunctive facts of the form X(x) E AI orX(x) E A2, which 
can only trigger the "approximate" rule. This indicates that it may be useful to 
equip inference ngines with rule approximation procedures; this can be done 
even with fuzzy rules and fuzzy facts (see Dubois et al. [19]). Finally note that 
the assumption AI N A2 = 0 can be easily removed provided that BIN B 2 is 
forced to be not empty as well, for the sake of consistency; indeed, in that case 
we can build the refined rule " i fX(x)  E Ai N A2 then Y(x) E B1 N B2," 
which requires that 3u, #BI(V) = #B2(U) = 1. 
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Rules  wi th  Except ions .  Speci f ic i ty  o f  a Ru le  
A rule with exceptions i a rule for which, when the condition part is certainly 
satisfied, it is still possible that the conclusion does not hold for some object x. 
What we propose is to replace a rule with exceptions of the form "Qx, if X(x) 
E A then Y(x) E B," where Q denotes a numerical or a linguistic quantifier 
different from v, such as "90% of" or "most of,"  by a rule of the form "¥x, if 
X(x) E A then Y(x) E B*," where B* is a fuzzy set defined from B as in (7) 
[i.e., #a* = max (PB, 3`)]. This transformation is based on the following 
principle. 
Assume Q is a subset of proportions of the form [q, 1], i.e., it means "at least 
the proportion q ."  q is a lower bound on the relative proportion of A's that are 
B's. When the rule is applied to a particular object Xo about which no a priori 
knowledge is available xcept hat X(xo) E A, then q is interpreted as the 
lower probability that X(xo) E B, and 1 - q represents he induced upper 
probability that X(xo) ~ B. Following the principle of minimum specificity 
(Dubois and Prade [10]), this upper probability is, mathematically speaking, a
degree of possibility in the sense of Zadeh [9] as long as q is viewed as a degree 
of belief in the sense of Shafer [2]. Hence the rule "Qx, i fX(x) E A then Y(x) 
E B"  is translated into the possibility distribution 
~'max [#B(v), h] i fu  E A 
~YIX( u, I ))  =- l 1 otherwise 
where 3`is defined by 3` = 1 - i n fQ  = 1 - q. 3, is an estimate of the 
possibility of encountering an object x that is an exception to the rule. For an 
explicit reatment of the available knowledge about he proportion of exceptions 
of a rule, see Zadeh's approach in terms of fuzzy probabilities (Zadeh [20]), 
which is systematically developed byDubois and Prade [21]. 
In the preceding section, we saw how from rules without exceptions (i.e., 
rules that hold for any object x that may be considered) we can obtain simpler 
rules with uncertain conclusions, i.e, with possible xceptions, by using some a 
priori knowledge of the values of secondary attribute variables in the condition 
part of the rule or by enlarging the sets used in the expression of the conditions. 
Conversely, we can assume that the existence of exceptions for a rule is due to 
the lack of specificity of the condition part of the rule. In other words, by making 
the condition part sufficiently restrictive ither by introducing new attributes X; 
of the objects x on which the value of Y(x) somewhat depends or by shrinking 
the sets involved in the expression of the conditions, we diminish the number of 
possible exceptions of the rule, i.e., the number of x's for which the value of 
Y(x) lies outside of B [the conclusion part of the rule being "Y(x) E B"]. 
A rule with a condition part "Xl(x) E AI and.., and Xn(x) E An" would be 
said to be more specific than a rule having "XI(x) E A 1' and ... and Xn(x) E 
A~" as its condition part if and only ifVi = 1, n, Ai c_ A~. Note that when an 
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attribute variable Xi appears in one rule and not in the other, we can add gi(x) 
E Ui (where Ui is the domain of Xi) to the condition part of the latter rule 
without modifying it, in order to be able to compare the two rules. Obviously 
when one rule is more specific than another one, it applies to a smaller number 
of cases. Thus specific rules have conclusions that are less pervaded with 
uncertainty, but we need more general rules also in order to be able to deal with 
situations where the available information is incomplete. 
We are now in a position to discuss the combination of uncertain or imprecise 
pieces of information obtained in rule-based systems. 
COMBINATION OF UNCERTAIN OR IMPRECISE PIECES OF 
INFORMATION 
Case of  Two Rules Exhibiting the Same Variable in Their Conclusion. 
General Discussion 
Let us consider two rules with the same attribute variable Z in their conclusion 
part: "vx,  i fX(x)  E A then Z(x) E C1" and "vx,  if Y(x) E BthenZ(x) E 
C2," where Cl and (?2 may be any kind of fuzzy sets of possible values; for 
simplicity here we consider ules with only one condition in their left-hand part. 
Let Xzlx and a-zl Y be the possibility distributions attached to the two rules, 
respectively. 
A SUFFICIENT CONDITION FOR VALID CONJUNCTIVE COMBINATION 
Starting with some information on the possible values of X and Y represented by
a-x and a-y, respectively, we can derive two possibility distributions restricting 
the possible values of Z, using the two rules (Zadeh [22]; Dubois and Prade 
[14]). These are 
Vw E W, a-[(w)=sup min [a-zlx(W, u), a'x(U)] 
uEU 
(11) 
Vw E W, a-2(w)=sup min [a-zly(W, v), a-y(V)] (12) 
t, EV  
The problem is then to combine a-~ and a-2 into a new possibility distribution a-z 
if suitable. If we require that the combination be pointwise [a-z(W) = a-~(w) 
*zZ(w), Vw], continuous, monotonic (a _ b, c _ d •, a * c >__ b * d), 
conjunctive-like (a * = a), associative and idempotent (a * a = a), rain 
operation is the only possible candidate for aggregating a-~ and a-2 z (Dubois and 
Prade [23]). This combination can be considered correct only if its result 
coincides with the result that would be obtained using the actual conditional 
possibility distribution a-Zl x, Y to represent the known influence of X and Y on Z, 
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i.e., if 
with 
Vw E W, min [x[(w), ~r2z(W)]=~rz(w) (13) 
vw ~_ W, 7rz(W)= sup rain [,rzlx, r(w, u, v), rex(U), ~'r(v)] (14) 
uE U, uE V 
Note that in (14) we assume that X and Y are noninteractive (Zadeh [24]), i.e., 
the possibility distribution lrx, v restricting the possible values of the pair of 
variables (X, Y) can be obtained as 
Vu E U, Vv E V, r(x,v)(u, v)=min [rx(U), r r (v)]  (15) 
This means that the possible values of one variable do not depend on the value 
taken by the other. More precisely, r(x, v) is defined by the membership function 
of some (fuzzy) Cartesian product F x G, when rx  = tt,~, 7rr = ~tG. 
It can be easily checked that if rZlX, r can be decomposed as 
vwE W, vu  E U, vvE  V, 
*rzlx, v(w, u, o)=min [,rzlx(w, u), 7rzlY(W, u)] (16) 
then (13) holds where ~r~ and lr 2 are given by (11) and (12). 
The decomposability property (16) presupposes, following Zadeh [24], that 
vw E W, Vu ~_ U, lrzlx(W, u)=sup *rZlX, r(w, u, u) (17) 
oE V 
and 
Vw E W, Vv E V, ~rzlr(w, o)=sup ~rzlx, r(w, u, v) (18) 
uEU 
Note that in (17) and (18) no a priori hypothesis made on the values of Yand 
X, respectively. Indeed we can write (17) as 
sup min [*rZlX, v(w, u, u), 7rx(U), ~'],(u)] =sup 7rzlx, y(w, u, v) 
vEV uEV 
where vu E U, vv E V, ~r~r(u) = ~'~,(v) = 1 (i.e., any value is completely 
possible for X as well as Y). 
A CASE OF FORBIDDEN COMBINATION When some fuzzy default value for Y, 
represented under the form of a nontrivial apriori possibility distribution ~.a paon °° Y]X 
< min 0r~, a'~,) = 1 [as in (6), for instance] is implicitly assumed in ~rZlX, 1.e., 
aprlori~ ~rzlx(w, u)=sup rain ['lrzix, y(W , u, v), "lr yi x I.v, u)] (19) 
uEV 
then (16) no longer holds. Thus in the case of implicit assumptions on the 
possible values of Y in ~rzlx or of X in ~rzl r, we have no particular relationship 
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between 7rzlx, y and min (a'ZlX, rZl r). Indeed, ~rZlX, r has not integrated all the 
existing a priori links between X and Y regardless of Z. But these links are 
(implicitly) used to construct the two rules represented by~rzlx and rzl r. So it is 
meaningless to think of reconstructing the rule presented by a'zlx, Y from these 
two rules only (i.e., ~ZlX and a'zl 1,) on the basis of (19) and its companion 
exchanging X and Y. 
Example Consider the situation mentioned by Zadeh, of a person using an 
electric shaver and taking a shower; the problem is to know whether this person 
may die. We have the two commonsense rules 
Rl When x shaves [X(x) = A ] then usually x does not die [Z(x) :~ C]. 
R2 When x takes a shower [Y(x) = B] then usually x does not die, which 
must be made compatible with the rule 
Rs When x shaves while taking a shower, then usually x dies! 
RI and R2 are modeled by the possibility distributions WzIx on {A, A } x { C, 
~} and 7rzlvon {B,/~} × {C, ~},  respectively. 
~ZlX ~zlY 
A ~ 1 B ~' 1 
A 1 1 B 1 1 
In fact, RI and R2 summarize the information 
R 1' When x shaves without aking a shower, x does not usually die. 
R~ When x takes a shower without shaving, x does not usually die. 
along with R3. Moreover, there is a priori knowledge about X and Y, which is 
that people do not shave while taking a shower or conversely, usually. 
R [, R 2 , and Rs are expressed by the following possibility distribution: 
rzlx, r(W, u, v)=E1 if w=C, u=A,  v=B (R~) 
=el' if w=C, u=A, v=B (R~) 
=~2 if w=~, u=A, v=B (Ra) 
= 1 otherwise 
In the definition of ~zlx, r, el, ~ [, and e2 are small numbers expressing almost 
total impossibility. When u = A, v =/~, the result is unknown [Xzlx, r(., A,/~) 
= 1 because x may then be involved in some other dangerous act. 
The a priori knowledge is that, indeed, people do not generally act 
dangerously; i.e., lr~°~i(A, B) = e3, 7r~P~(B, A) = e4, and 1 otherwise. 
78 Didier Dubois and Henri Prade 
Using (6) leads to 
lrZlx( C, A )=max {rain [lrzlx, y(C, A, B), ~rxiy(A, B)], 
rain [lrzix, r(C, A, B), lrxiY(A, B)]} 
= max {min (1, e3), min (el, 1)} = max (el, e3) 
lrzlx(C , ft)= lrzlx(C, A)= lrzlx(~, ~])= 1 
We thus recover the original table giving ~rzlx with e = max (el, e3), and the 
same happens with 7rzl r; moreover, C = max (el', e4). Note that the 
information regarding R3 is lost. 
Assume that X does shave while taking a shower. Then we find, using ~'ZlX 
and 7rzl y, 
e;  = 1 
Combining via a conjunctive operation (the minimum) leads to a stupid 
conclusion. If  ~rzlx. r is used, then we find ~rz(C) = 1 and ~'z(~) = e2. Clearly 
this conclusion cannot be reached by combining ~.1 and ~r 2. 
In the above example, the a priori knowledge about X and Yconflicts with the 
available observed facts A and B. A conflict clearly appears because it is known 
that A and B are generally mutually exclusive. This a priori knowledge becomes 
obsolete in the face of the actual facts A and B; however, this knowledge is 
useful to detect he lack of completeness of the set of rules { RI, R2 } when R3 is 
not given. . 
Concluding this example, two possibility distributions restricting the possible 
values of the same variable can be combined (using the rain operation) without 
damage when we are sure that the reasons motivating each possibility 
distribution do not contradict one another. Otherwise the combination becomes 
meaningless. 
RULES WITH DEPENDENT CONDITION PARTS By "dependent condition 
parts" is meant two different kinds of interactions between the variables 
appearing in the " i f "  part of the rules. 
• Logical or functional interactions between X(x) and Y(x) that are already 
imbedded in the conditional possibility distribution ~'zl x, Y of which the two 
rules " i f  X(x) is A then Z(x) is C1" and "if Y(x) is B then Z(x) is C2" 
are approximations. An extreme case of such as interaction is when X = 
Y. But it can also consist of values of (X, Y) that are forbidden or make no 
sense in the given context. 
• Usual or default interaction, imbedded in an a priori possibility distribution 
~ra ~on which can be expressed as rules of the form "if X(x) is E then X,Y  , 
usually Y(x) is F "  or/and " i f  Y(x) is F '  then usually X(x) is E ' . "  This 
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type of knowledge does not express a genuine interaction between X and Y 
but mentions the fact that in most circumstances the value of (X, Y) will be 
located in a given area. 
In the general case when both interactions are taken into account, the two rules 
linking X to Z and Y to Z are default rules that can be viewed as deriving from 
*rzlx, ~, and ~.a p~io, by (6). When 7rzlx and 7rzl r are not based on some "X ,  Y 
presupposition with respect o the other variable Y or X, respectively, then we 
have 
7rzIx, y <--lrfln ( *rZlX, zl r) (20) 
which expresses that *rzlx, Y is likely to give more precise results than what is 
obtained by combining the result of the two rules. The case of independent rules 
exists when ~rzlx, ~" is decomposable and *rx. ~,a p,on = I. This case was studied 
earlier. 
When there is no default interaction but logical interaction exists, then (20) 
holds with a strict inequality. When default interaction is present, (20) no longer 
holds, as we have seen in the preceding subsection because this default 
interaction may contradict the simultaneous location of X in A and Y in B. 
Let R be a fuzzy relation linking X and Y regardless of Z and integrating both 
logical and default interactions, i.e., 
/zR(u, v )=min [sup lrZlX.r(w, u, v), apnon, rx,~" tu, u)] 
Iv 
Note that if (u, o) is logically impossible as a value of (X, Y), then ~lw, 
lrZlX, r(u, v, w) > 0. Such an impossibility can be graded by relaxing this 
condition into supw 7rzlx, r(u, v, w) < 1 for the value (u, v). 
Several situations may occur that need a different reatment of the two rules 
" i f  X(x)  E A then Z(x) E C1" and " i f  Y(x) E B then Z(x) E C2." 
1. R f3 (A × B) = 0, i.e., min (/~R, tta, #B) is subnormalized. In that case 
the two rules cannot be applied simultaneously, and when X(x)  E A and 
Y(x) E B occur at the same time, neither of the two rules should be 
applied. The knowledge of the relation R is then very useful in detecting 
such cases and may be used as a demon in the rule base. When this case 
occurs, there are two possibilities: 
• When (X, Y) E A x B is forbidden only as a default option, there should 
be a special rule that applies to that specific case. This is what happens in 
the example of the previous ubsection. 
• When (X, Y) E A x B is functionally forbidden, then the demon should 
stop the reasoning process because of a contradiction i the observed facts. 
2. R 1"3 (A × B) ~ 0, i.e., min (#A, /LB, /~R) is normalized. In that case R is 
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not contradictory to (X, Y) E A x B. The two rules can be 
simultaneously applied; however, the actual result may be more specific 
than the combination of the results of the two rules. If the observed facts 
are X E A ' ,  Y E B ' ,  then the actual result can be approximated using R 
by 
#c(W) =suop min [#A,(u), #B,(v), rZlx(w, u), rZlr(W, u), #R(w, v)] 
->sup min [#A,(u), #a,(o), lrzlx, r(w, u, v~rap~i°~i(u o)] 
which is the actual result. When ~.,~p~ori = 1 and #R(u, v) expresses the 
equality X = Y, then let x l lx  and'~r2qx be the possibility distributions 
associated with the two rules. Then A '  = B' and 
#c(W)=sup min [#A'(U), ~rlZlx(W, U), r2Zlx(W, U)] (21) 
_<rain {sup min [#A'(U), 7rlzlx(W, U)], sup rain [#A,(u), 
~zlx(W, ~)]} 
which expresses the fact that it is better in that case to combine the two 
rules and apply the result o the fact A '  rather than apply each rule to A '  
separately and then combine. The latter result is valid but may provide 
results that are too imprecise, as already mentioned in Dubois and Prade 
[14]. Note that this is true even when A and B are not fuzzy (Martin- 
Clouaire and Prade [5]) since when A" = ALI  B neither of the two rules 
" i f  X(x) E A then Z(x) E C]," " i f  X(x) E B then Z(x) E Cz" 
applies, so the result of combining the two results is indeterminate. 
However, applying (21) leads to C = C] U C2, which is more specific. 
See Dubois et al. [19] for a systematic application of this idea in the 
implementation f Zadeh's generalized modus ponens (Zadeh [22]). 
The only case when the combination (via the minimum operation) of the 
results C l' and C 2 of each rule proves to be exact is when #R(u, v) = 1 for all u, 
v, i.e., there is no interaction between X and Y, and rZlX, Y is decomposable. 
But #R = 1 does not mean that rzlx, r is decomposable. 
Example Consider the two rules 
Generally, when a man is bald, he is old. 
Generally, when a man walks slowly, he is old. 
represented by means of variables 
X E { bald, not bald }, Y E { slow walk, fast walk}, Z E { old, not 
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old} 
~zlx and Xzl r are represented as follows: 
lrZlX not bald 
old 1 1 
not old a 1 
~rzl r slow 
old 1 
not old b 
But the fact that a man is both bald and a slow walker reinforces our belief in 
the person's old age, i.e., lrzlx, r(not old, bald, slow) = c < min (a, b). 
However, given that somebody is bald, there is no evidence about his walking 
slow or fast, not is there any evidence of someone being bald when he's a slow 
walker! Hence ttR = 1. 
This example points out that the knowledge of/~R can be insufficient to get a 
correct response from the conjoint use of the rules and the interaction between 
their condition parts. This is the reinforcement effect hat is sometimes modeled 
using another conjunction operation different from the minimum. However, the 
proper choice of this operation is in itself a tricky problem. Namely, there is 
probably no universal reinforcement operation. It sounds better to elicit a new 
rule that applies when X E A and Y E B occur simultaneously. 
The Most Specific Rule Must Be Preferred 
Let us consider the two rules "Vx, i fX(x)  E A then Z(x) E C1" and "¥x,  if 
X(x) E A and Y(x) E B then Z(x) E C2." Provided that the first does not 
hypothesize anything about Y(x) and the conclusions of the two rules are as 
specific as possible, we must have C~ _~ (?2; indeed, our knowledge on the value 
of Z(x) can only be improved when the considered situation is particularized [by 
the supplementary condition Y(x) E B]. Similarly, the rule "¥x, if X(x) E 
A' ,  then Z(x) E C3" where A" _ A must be such that (?3 _c C1. Thus the 
most specific rule that can be applied in a given situation must be preferred, 
since it yields a more precise and less uncertain conclusion. 
This result generalizes the above remarks about the reinforcement effect. 
When there are two cascaded rules, Rl = "Vx, i fX(x)  E A then Y(x) E B ' "  
and R2 = "Vx, if Y(x) E B then Z(x) E C,"  we can deduce the new rule R3 
= "¥x,  i fX(x)  E A then Z(x) E C'" as soon as B '  _ B. This is true even if 
A, B, B ' ,  and C are fuzzy sets (see Dubois and Prade [14] in this case) provided 
that the rule "vx, if Y(x) E B then Z(x) E C"  does not assume anything about 
the values X(x) implicitly. Indeed, assume that this rule is a default rule in 
actual fact, that is, it holds except if it turns out that X(x) is located in some 
subset A' of U and A '  = A, then the resulting rule R3 is not valid, and we may 
even find the case when the actual rule relating Xand Zcontradicts R3, i.e., says 
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that vx, i fX(x)  E A then Z(x) E C', when C' CI C = 0[ On the contrary, 
when R2 can be applied regardless of the values of variables other than Y, 
chaining is permitted and rule R3 makes sense. But it may turn out that a direct 
rule linking X and Z would provide results that, although consistent with those 
obtained from the chain R! and R2, would be more precise. This direct rule can 
be of the form R4: '"¢X, i fX(x)  E A then Z(x) E C' ," where C'  is a proper 
subset of C. The chain of rules R~ and R2 becomes useless in front of the direct 
rule R4, i.e., C and C'  need not be combined because C simply becomes 
redundant when C'  is true. In the first situation discussed (when R2 is a default 
rule and R4 contradicts it), the combination was strictly forbidden because the 
result obtained through chaining Rl and R2 was just wrong. 
EXAMPLE 
R~ Bats are mammals. 
R2 Mammals do not fly usually. 
Clearly, in this example the chaining of RI and R2 is meaningless, because we 
have the more specific rule saying that R4: Bats fly. Hence it would be absurd to 
combine the two antagonistic results "it flies" and "it does not fly" and come 
up with a balanced opinion! The other situation is exemplified by the following 
set of rules: 
Rj Cows are mammals. 
R 2 Mammals produce milk. 
R4 Cows produce drinkable milk. 
Thus, knowing the value of X, it is always preferable to use a rule relating X to 
Z directly (if such a rule exists that is applicable), rather than chaining rules in 
cascade. Note that in the situation considered here, the rule "Vx, if X(x) E A 
then Z(x) E C" can be regarded as more specific than the rule "vx,  if Y(x) E 
B then Z(x) E C'," since the condition Y(x) E B can be added in the 
condition part of the first one [due to "¥x, i fX(x)  E A then Y(x) E B"] and 
obviously A x B _c U x B. Many authors interested in default or approximate 
reasoning haze recently pointed out that a single rule should always be preferred 
to a chain of rules, in the framework of different approaches; ee Reiter and 
Criscuolo [25], Minsky [26], Ginsberg [27], Touretzky [28], Poole [29], Shastri 
and Feldman [30], Dubois et al. [31], Farreny and Prade [16], and Gascuel et al. 
[32], among others. 
Combining an Established Piece of Information with a Default Value 
The principle of the most specific rule can be generalized to the question of 
pooling default and nondefault information. Let us consider an example. We 
have two pieces of information about John's possible age. The first is 
represented by a possibility distribution with a bounded support S. It expresses 
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Figure 1. Partial conflict between sure and default information 
that for some reason we are absolutely certain that John's age takes its value in 
S. Moreover, 7r expresses that in S some values are regarded as more possible 
than others. The second piece of information is made of two parts: (1) the fact 
that John is bald; (2) the default rule "Usually, bald men are not very young." 
The conclusion of these two statements can be represented by a possibility 
distribution ~r* of the form 7r* = max Or', ~), where a" is a possibility 
distribution (with a bounded support) associated with "not very young" and e is 
a small possibility degree that accounts for the possibility of encountering an 
exception to the default rule. When the supports of ~" and 7r' do not overlap (or 
more precisely when sups min [~r(s), 7r' (s)] - e), the situation seems clear: John 
is an exception to the default rule and only the information represented by 7r 
should be kept. In case of overlapping (see Figure 1), the combination problem 
appears to be much trickier. 
Sometimes it seems that empirically the result of the combination of lr and ,r*, 
namely, the possibility distribution 7r _l. 7r*, should be such that (i) ~r _L ~'* = 0 
outside S; (ii) 7r .1. 7r* = ~" on the part of the attribute domain where ~r* = ~; 
and (iii) on the remaining part of the domain where ~- is strictly positive, a- .l_ r *  
> ,r, since we have a new reason, supposedly not taken into account in 7r, 
namely "John is bald," for supporting the fact that the ages in this area are 
indeed possible for John. Even if some numerical combination procedures can 
be imagined for _l. that satisfy requirements (i)-(iii), they will remain ad hoc, 
and it seems difficult to choose among them. Note that here the trouble comes 
from the fact that there is no hope of having a more specific rule whose 
conclusion would be represented by 7r & 7r*. This type of combination underlies 
the assumption that default information is not of sufficient value for making a 
vague but sure fact more specific. An entirely opposite combination principle (a 
less cautious one) would try to refine the sure fact by keeping the benefit of the 
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default information as long as it is not inconsistent with S; see Dubois and Prade 
[33] for the combination i  agreement with this second point of view. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we have emphasized the danger of performing, in a blind 
manner, the combination of imprecise or uncertain pieces of knowledge in rule- 
based expert systems. Indeed some inconsistency may exist between the 
assumptions, often implicit, underlying the estimates of the uncertainty 
pervading the various pieces of information we wish to combine. A way to cope 
with this problem seems to detect, in a compilation phase, the rules whose 
conclusions bear on the values of the same variable(s) and whose condition parts 
do not appear to be mutually exclusive. Then the expert is asked about the 
existence of possible implicit assumptions, in each considered rule, on the value 
of some variable that is present elsewhere (especially in the other rules that 
conclude on the same variable). In that case the expert has to state one or more 
new rules that are specific for the exceptions that may be encountered. 
Otherwise a combination can be performed between the results given by the 
different rules if they are used simultaneously in a consistent way. 
When the combination between two possibility distributions i performed by 
means of a min operation, each possible value of the variable under 
consideration receives the smallest of the two degrees of possibility attached to 
this value. Thus if two sources consider that a value has a low degree of 
possibility, there is no reinforcement-no lower degree of possibility is assigned 
to this value in the combination process. This contrasts with other existing 
approaches (e.g., the Dempster rule of combination discussed by Shafer [2]), 
which have an inductive flavor since a reinforcement takes place in the 
combination. In the absence of information other than the two distributions 
themselves, an automatic reinforcement may be debatable. In cases where the 
expert knows that a reinforcement must take place, a new rule may be introduced 
that specifies a possibility distribution that would be more restrictive than the 
one obtained via the min operation. In any case the result obtained using min will 
be valid even if it is not sufficiently restrictive. In addition, the combination of 
two normalized possibility distributions by the min operation may yield a result 
that is no longer normalized (i.e., no value has a possibility degree qual to 1). 
Provided that the combination is licit, it means that the only possible values that 
remain have received a priori low degrees of possibility. Then a normalization 
(see Sharer [2], Martin-Clouaire and Prade [5], and Dubois and Prade [6] for 
details) may be performed in order to rescale the degrees of the remaining 
possible values. This corresponds to a nonmonotonic change in the representa- 
tion of our belief. Similar normalization problems occur with other numerical 
approaches. 
However, the normalization step must be carefully applied; indeed, it 
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generally creates adiscontinuity in the combination operation. This discontinuity 
effect occurs when the conflict is very severe, and normalization should then be 
avoided (see Dubois and Prade [6]). 
In conclusion, numerical approaches are desirable for modeling uncertainty in
order to be able to express that some alternatives are more certain or less 
impossible than others. Possibility theory, due the extensive use of max and rain, 
does not require two precise an estimation of the possibility degrees, and min 
provides a cautious conjunctive combination operation. However, the implicit 
assumptions that underlie the estimation of uncertainty degrees cannot be 
completely ignored in the combination process, and often it is necessary to add 
new rules that are specific for exceptional situations not covered by the rules 
initially introduced. This goes against the myth of modularity in rule-based 
expert systems when the knowledge is uncertain; this myth is more and more 
questioned by researchers (e.g., Heckerman and Horvitz [34]). 
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